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COMMENTS
REGULATING INDECENT BROADCASTING: SETTING SAIL
FROM SAFE HARBORS OR SUNK BY THE V-CHIP?
Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press....
- First Amendment
Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language
by means of radio communication shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
- 18 U.S.C. § 1464
I. INTRODUCTION
"Family values" has become a familiar phrase in all arenas of
American life. As a result of the increasing concern over family
values in broadcasting, the religious right, as well as the liberal
left, have tried to stay the progression of moral decadence in
our youth. The concerns have been directed towards violent,
sexual and vulgar content in radio, television, and films.
Since the inception of the Radio Act of 1927,1 the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) has promulgated regula-
tions restricting the broadcasting of indecent programming.
Most recently, Congress and the FCC prohibited indecent broad-
casting during certain hours of the day in order to protect the
well-being of children and to assist parents in the supervision
of their children. However, portions of the provisions have been
1. Ch. 4, 44 Stat. 1162 § 83 (Feb. 23, 1927) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 81, repealed
by ch. 652 Title VI, 48 Stat. 1102 (June 19, 1934)).
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held unconstitutional by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir-
cuit. Additionally, the assumption that indecent material harms
children has been questioned by petitioners, researchers and
Judge Edwards of the D.C. Circuit Court. The Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996,2 recently passed by Congress and signed by
President Clinton, has further attempted to protect children by
requiring a "V-chip" in all new televisions so that parents can
block television programs which they feel are inappropriate for
their children.?
This comment begins by examining the recent history of the
regulation of indecent broadcasting, with a focus on the con-
gressional responses to the decisions of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Through these decisions
and congressional responses, the development of the law of
indecency will be discussed. Part III will consider the latest
Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT IIIR)4 decision
and its effect on indecent broadcasting statutes and rules. Part
IV will question whether the assumptions upon which the regu-
lation of indecent broadcasting is based are valid. The recent
legislation requiring all new televisions to be equipped with a
chip allowing parents to block certain broadcasts will be ex-
plored in part V. Finally, this comment concludes that since the
V-chip is required by law, broadcasters may again challenge the
FCC regulations as not being the least restrictive means avail-
able. Eventually, as the V-chip becomes more widespread in
television, the courts may be forced to find for the challengers,
possibly prompting the United States Supreme Court to decide
the issue.
2. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
3. Id. § 551, 110 Stat. 56.
4. 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995), reh'g, 11 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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II. A RECENT HISTORY OF REGULATION OF INDECENT AND
OBSCENE BROADCASTING
A. The Statutes and Definitions
1. The Statutes
Obscene and indecent broadcasting have been regulated since
the advent of the FCC. Section 29 of the Radio Act of 1927,
originally provided that
[niothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to
give the licensing authority the power of censorship over the
radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio
station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated
or fixed by the licensing authority which shall interfere
with the right of free speech by means of radio communica-
tions. No person within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall utter any obscene, indecent, or profane language by
means of radio communication.5
The anti-censorship provision and the prohibition against inde-
cent broadcasts were re-enacted in Section 29 of the Communi-
cations Act of 1934.6 The prohibition against obscene, indecent
and profane broadcasts was removed in 1948 from the Commu-
nications Act and re-enacted as 18 U.S.C. § 1464.' The censor-
ship provision is now codified at 47 U.S.C. § 326.8
Today, 18 U.S.C. § 1464 provides that "[w]hoever utters any
obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio com-
munication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both."9 Although section 29 of the Ra-
5. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 735 (1978) (quoting 44 Stat. 1172-73)
(emphasis added).
6. Id. at 738; see 47 U.S.C. 151 (1934), amended by ch. 229, § 1, 50 Stat. 189
(1937).
7. Id. (citing 62 Stat. 769, 866 (1948)).
8. Id. at 734 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 326 (amended 1948)).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1994) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988)). Pub. L. 103-322,
§ 330016(1)(L) had struck out "not more than $10,000" and inserted "under this title"
following "shall be fined". Pub. L. 103-322, § 33016(1)(L) (1994).
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dio Act of 1927"° generally prohibits censorship, the censorship
language has been interpreted as "inapplicable to the prohibi-
tion on broadcasting obscene, indecent or profane language."'"
However, the fact that the censorship language does not apply
to the prohibition on broadcasting obscene, indecent or profane
language does not give the government free reign at restricting
this type of language. Instead, each type is accorded different
regulatory treatment.
2. Distinguishing the Indecent from the Obscene
Distinguishing indecent material from obscene material is
important for two reasons. First, because the words are written
disjunctively in the statute, each has a separate meaning.'
Secondly, and more importantly, whereas obscene material is
not accorded constitutional protection, indecent material is ac-
corded First Amendment rights. 3
In Miller v. California,'4 the United States Supreme Court
described obscene material-as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1464-as
works that "appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which por-
tray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which,
taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value." 5 The Court defined prurient interest as a
"shameful, morbid, or unhealthy interest in sex." 6 Unlike pru-
rient interest, the Court has failed to provide a concrete defini-
tion of "patently offensive." However, the Court has deemed
materials "so offensive on their face as to affront current com-
munity standards of decency" 7 or materials that go "substan-
10. 44 Stat. 1172-73 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 326 (amended 1948)).
11. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 738.
12. Id. at 739-40.
13. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (stating that
"[s]exual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First
Amendment"); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 657 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (quoting Sable, 492 U.S. at 126).
14. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
15. Id. at 24.
16. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades,
472 U.S. 491, 496-98 (1985).
17. Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 482 (1962).
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tially beyond customary limits of candor in description or repre-
sentation of such matters,"8 as patently offensive.
"Indecency," under 18 U.S.C. § 1464, was not defined by the
FCC until 1970. The FCC adopted a broad definition of "inde-
cency" in response to an aired interview with Jerry Garcia of
the Grateful Dead on WUHY Philadelphia, a college FM sta-
tion.' The broadcast was found to violate section 1464 because
its language was "patently offensive by contemporary communi-
ty standards and wholly without redeeming social value."0
The FCC considered the interview indecent rather than obscene
because the language lacked an appeal to the prurient inter-
est-a requirement of obscenity ' ---as the expletives were un-
necessary and "gratuitous." Thus, the earliest definition of inde-
cency exposed by the FCC paralleled that of obscenity, simply
lacking an appeal to the prurient interest.
Responding to a complaint by a man who had listened with
his young son to a broadcast of comedian George Carlin's
twelve-minute long monologue entitled "Filthy Words" on a
radio station owned by Pacifica Foundation, the FCC expounded
a generic definition of indecency in In re Pacifica Foundation."
This generic definition was upheld in FCC v. Pacifica Founda-
tion" and the series of Action for Children's Television v. FCC
cases.24 Specifically, "broadcast indecency" is defined "as lan-
18. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 487
n.20).
19. See Leli Levi, The Hard Case of Broadcast Indecency, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 49, 88 (1992/93); THOMAS G. KRATrENMAKER & LucAs A. POWE, JR.,
REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 104 (1994). "In just six paragraphs, [Garcia]
used like improperly and redundantly sixteen times. But the same was equally true
for fuck and shit, which he used as adjectives or substitutes for et cetera, and occa-
sionally as introductory expletives." KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 19, at 104.
20. WUHY-FM, Eastern Education Radio, Notice of Apparent Liability, 24
F.C.C.2d 408 T 7 (1970); see Levi, supra note 19.
21. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 488; KRATrENMAKER & POWE, supra note 19, at 104.
22. 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975). This FCC decision explained that
the concept of "indecent" is intimately connected with the exposure of
children to language that describes, in terms patently offensive as mea-
sured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium,
sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when there
is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience.
Id. at 98.
23. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
24. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988) [here-
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guage or material that, in context depicts or describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activi-
ties or organs."25 Arguments that the definition of "indecent"
was vague and overbroad have been struck down by four Action
for Children's Television Cases: ACT I,2" ACT j,2" ACT III,'
and ACT IIIR.
29
B. Enforcement Procedure"°
The FCC has authority, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 503(b),3 to
impose sanctions for any violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464. The
FCC does not conduct random investigations, but instead, re-
sponds when a complaint regarding a possible indecent broad-
cast is filed by a viewer or listener. 2 When the FCC receives
such a complaint, "FCC staff members examine the complaint
to determine whether the broadcast would fall within the pa-
rameters of the FCC's indecency enforcement practice."33 Once
the staff determines that the complaint falls within the parame-
ters, "the FCC staff members in the Complaints and Investiga-
tions Branch, Enforcement Division, Mass Media Bureau
[MMB] make a threshold recommendation whether to proceed
inafter ACT I]; Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir.
1991) [hereinafter ACT 11; Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 11 F.3d 170 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) [hereinafter ACT III]; Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 170
(D.C. Cir. 1995) [hereinafter ACT IIIR], reh'g ACT III, 11 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
25. ACT IIIR, 58 F.3d at 657 (citing In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against
Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 8 F.C.C.R. 704, 705 n.10 (1993) ("1993
Report and Order")).
26. ACT I, 852 F.2d 1332.
27. ACT II, 932 F.2d 1504.
28. ACT III, 11 F.3d 170.
29. ACT IIIR, 58 F.3d 654.
30. The enforcement procedure and the forfeiture provisions will not be discussed
within this comment in detail because the issues and cases are substantial enough to
merit a separate article.
31. 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(D) (1993) ("Any person who is determined ... to
have . . . violated any provision of section 1304, 1343, or 1464 of title 18, United
States Code; shall be liable to the United States for a forfeiture penalty .....
32. See, e.g., supra note 22 and accompanying text.
33. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 827 F. Supp. 4, 5 (D.D.C. 1993) (chal-
lenging the FCC enforcement procedure).
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with an investigation of the complaint."' The complaint will
be dismissed if the MMB, in consultation with the General
Counsel's Office and/or the Commissioners' Assistants, decides
that the complaint does not warrant investigation. 5
However, if an investigation is warranted, a Letter of Inquiry
(LOI) will be sent by FCC staff members to the broadcaster
named in the complaint.36 The LOI requests additional infor-
mation from the broadcaster, allowing the broadcaster to re-
spond to the complaint prior to a final determination by the
FCC.37
After receiving the broadcaster's response to the LOI, the
staff must conclude whether or not there in fact was a viola-
tion. If there was a violation, a Notice of Apparent Liability
(NAL) is sent to the broadcaster alleging the violation and
requesting payment of a fine.3 ' The broadcaster can "either
pay the forfeiture or submit ... an opposition to the NAL in
which it can explain why a forfeiture should not be imposed or
should be reduced."39 Thus, the NAL is not a final determina-
tion of an indecency violation.
After reviewing the broadcaster's response to the NAL, the
FCC will decide whether a forfeiture is appropriate. ° The
broadcaster may petition for reconsideration after the issuance
of a forfeiture. If rejected, the broadcaster may refuse to pay
the forfeiture in which case the FCC will ask the United States
Attorney to commence an action to recover the forfeiture.4 "In
34. Id. at 6.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 6-7.
39. Id. at 7.
40. Id. In making the forfeiture determination, the FCC "considers a number of
factors including 'the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violation and,
with respect to the violator, the degree of culpability, any history of prior offenses,
ability to pay, and such other matters as justice may require.' Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. §
503(b)(2)(D); 47 C.F.R. 1.80(b)(4)).
41. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1995),
affg 827 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1993).
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defending the suit the broadcaster is entitled to a trial de novo
on the question whether its broadcast was indecent."42
C. A Dress Rehearsal and Three ACTs: Case Development of
Indecent Broadcasting
1. A Dress Rehearsal: FCC v. Pacifica Foundation'
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation was the first challenge to the
indecency portion of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 to reach the Supreme
Court. Here the Supreme Court not only validated the FCC's
definition of indecency, but more importantly, maintained that
the FCC had the power to regulate indecent broadcasts.
After receiving a complaint from a listener, the FCC issued a
declaratory order which found that a radio station owned by
the Pacifica Foundation had violated 18 U.S.C. § 1464's prohibi-
tion against indecency." The broadcast, which had aired at
two o'clock in the afternoon, was a monologue by comedian
George Carlin, called "Filthy Words."' In its declaratory order,
the FCC concluded:
[Wiords such as "fuck," "shit," "piss," "motherfucker,"
"cocksucker," "cunt," and "tit" depict sexual and excretory
activities and organs in a manner patently offensive by
contemporary community standards ... broadcast at a time
when children were undoubtedly in the audience (i.e., in the
early afternoon). Moreover, the pre-recorded language with
the words repeated over and over was deliberately broad-
cast.'
When asked to clarify its order, the FCC pointed out that "it
never intended to place an absolute prohibition on the broad-
cast of this type of language, but rather sought to channel it to
42. Id. (citing Pleasant Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 564 F.2d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
43. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
44. 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975); see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
45. The monologue was a parody of, as Carlin described them, "words you could-
n't even say on the public ... airways,... the ones you definitely wouldn't say,
ever." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 751 (appendix to the opinion of the court containing a
verbatim transcript of "Filthy Words").
46. In re Pacifica, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 99 (1975).
838 [Vol. 30:831
1996] REGULATING INDECENT BROADCASTING 839
times of day when children most likely would not be exposed to
it."47 The concept of channelling indecent material later ap-
pears in both statutes and regulations, and is also a subject of
contention in the ACT cases. The FCC limited the declaratory
order to the specific facts."
After the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed the FCC order and reconsidera-
tion,49 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
decide:
(1) whether the scope of judicial review encompasses more
than the Commission's determination that the monologue
was indecent "as broadcast"7; (2) whether the Commission's
order was a form of censorship forbidden by [47 U.S.C.] §
326; (3) whether the broadcast was indecent within the
meaning of [18 U.S.C.] § 1464; and (4) whether the order
violates the First Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution.'
The Court found that the focus of its review should be on the
determination of whether the broadcast was indecent."' On the
second issue, the Court explained that respect for legislative
intent requires that the censorship language of section 326 be
read as "inapplicable to the prohibition on broadcasting obscene,
47. In re 'Petition for Clarification or Reconsideration' of a Citizen's Complaint
against Pacifica Found., 59 F.C.C.2d 892 (1976).
48. Id. at 893.
49. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (1977). Judge Tamm explained,
[a]s we find that the Commission's Order is in violation of its duty to
avoid censorship of radio communications under 47 U.S.C. § 326 and that
even assuming, arguendo, that the Commission may regulate non-obscene
speech, nevertheless its Order is overbroad and vague, therefore we must
reverse the Order.
Id. at 18. Chief Judge Brazelon's concurrence maintained that 47 U.S.C. § 326's pro-
hibition against censorship was inapplicable to broadcasts forbidden by 14 U.S.C. §
1464. However, Chief Judge Brazelon concluded that § 1464 must be narrowly con-
strued to cover only language that is obscene or otherwise unprotected by the First
Amendment. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 733-34 (1978) (citing Pacifica
Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 24-30 (1977)). In dissent, Judge Leventhal found that the
FCC could regulate indecent broadcasts in the interest of protecting children. Id.
(citing Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 31, 37 (1977)).
50. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 734 (1978).
51. Id. at 735.
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indecent, or profane language."52 The third issue was resolved
by the Court finding that indecent language does not require
prurient appeal and that because the broadcast was patently
offensive, it was therefore indecent.5 3
The Court considered the fourth question in more depth.
Recognizing that "each medium of expression presents special
First Amendment problems,"54 the Court explained that "of all
forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the
most limited First Amendment protection."55 Two reasons were
given for the distinction between broadcasting and other medi-
ums. First, because the broadcast media have a "uniquely per-
vasive presence in the lives of all Americans," patently offensive
indecent material encounters citizens both in public and in the
privacy of their home.5" Furthermore, privacy in the home was
found to outweigh the First Amendment rights of the intrud-
er.57 Although some indecent broadcasts may warn audiences,
these warnings cannot completely protect the unsuspecting
viewer who tunes in and out.58
Second, the Court was concerned with broadcasting's accessi-
bility to children. Whereas other forms of offensive material
may be withheld from children without restricting the expres-
sion at the source, this is not presently the case with broadcast-
ing.59 For instance, bookstores and movie theaters may be pro-
hibited from distributing indecent material to children. ° Addi-
tionally, in Ginsberg v. New York,61 the Court had found that
the "government's interest in the 'well being of its youth' and in
supporting 'parents' claim to authority in their own household'
justified the regulation of otherwise protected expression."62
52. Id. at 738; see supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
53. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 739, 741. For definitions of prurient interest and patent-
ly offensive, see supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
54. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748 (citing Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495,
502-03 (1952)).
55. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
56. Id.; see also KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 19, at 197.
57. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748; see also KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 19, at
197.
58. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 390 U.S. 629, (1964).
62. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640,
840 [Vol. 30:831
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Therefore, privacy in the home coupled with protection of chil-
dren justified cleaning the public airways of material inappro-
priate for children.
The first Supreme Court case challenging the indecency por-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 resulted in a narrow and case-specific
finding of indecency while contemporaneously finding that the
FCC definition of indecency was valid, 18 U.S.C. § 1464 was
constitutional, and that indecent materials could be channeled
to late-night hours. 3 The narrow finding of indecency in Paci-
fica became a bright-line test that simply prohibited repeated
use of the "seven dirty words" before 10:00 p.m." However,
there was little enforcement by the FCC because broadcasters
stayed away from the "seven dirty words" and the FCC held to
the narrow interpretation of the indecency standard.65
2. ACT I: Action for Children's Television v. FCC"
In 1987, after years of non-enforcement of the indecency
standard, the FCC changed the course of indecent broadcasting
regulation for the future. In its attempt to protect children from
indecent broadcasting, the FCC expanded its interpretation of
indecency and narrowed the times during which indecent mate-
rial could be aired. Three opinions-In re Infinity Broadcasting
Corporation of Pennsylvania,7 In re Pacifica Foundation,68
and In re Regents of the University of California69-declared
various broadcast materials (two of which were broadcast after
639 (1968)); see also KRATrENMAKER & POWE, supra note 19, at 197 (stating that
"[plarents may need help in their own households, and the government has its own
independent interest in the 'well-being of its youth" (citing Pacifica, 438 U.S. at
749)).
63. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 892-93.
64. Levi, supra note 19, at 90-91.
65. Id. at 91.
66. Act I, 852 F.2d 1332.
67. 2 F.C.C.R. 2705 (1987). In Infinity, the FCC found that portions of Howard
Stern's radio talk show, airing from 6 a.m. to 10 a.m. on weekdays, were indecent.
Id.
68. 2 F.C.C.R. 2698 (1987). In Pacifica Foundation, the FCC decided that excerpts
from a play called "Jerker" were actionable even though broadcast between 10 p.m.
and 11 p.m. Id.
69. 2 F.C.C.R. 2703 (1987). In Regents of U.C., the FCC believed it could regulate
a broadcast, after 10 p.m., of a song entitled "Makin' Bacon." Id.
1996]
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10 p.m. and one that was broadcast between 6 a.m. and 10
a.m.) to be indecent. In conjunction with these three opinions,
the FCC issued a public notice that summarized the opinions
and gave all broadcasters notice of the new standards.70 After
receiving several petitions for reconsideration of the three opin-
ions, the FCC responded with a reconsideration order that af-
firmed its prior decisions and explained its change in policy."
Most importantly, the FCC warned broadcasters that "10:00
p.m. can no longer be considered the hour after which indecent
programming may be aired" but instead, midnight was the
FCC's "current thinking" on "a reasonable delineation point."2
Effectively, the FCC created a midnight to 6:00 a.m. "safe har-
bor" for indecent materials. 3
On appeal, the petitioners claimed the FCC's broadened inde-
cency enforcement standard was facially invalid because it was
unconstitutionally vague.74 The intervenors contended that the
FCC's mode of stamping material indecent was substantially
overbroad. 5 Petitioners also urged that the FCC's action was
arbitrary and capricious because the change in regulatory
course was not accompanied by the requisite "reasoned analy-
sis." 6 In conjunction with the claim of arbitrary and capri-
cious, the petitioners claimed that the safe-harbor provision
interfered with adults' First Amendment rights to see and hear
indecent material.7
After establishing the FCC's authority to regulate indecent
broadcasts by considering the Supreme Court's decision in Paci-
fica,7 the court of appeals concluded that the FCC had em-
ployed the informal adjudication format to promulgate a rule of
70. Kristin A.- Finch, Lights, Camera, and Action for Children's Television v. FCC:
The Story of Broadcast Indecency, Starring Howard Stern, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1275,
1300 (1995) (citing Public Notice, 2 F.C.C.R. 2726 (1987)).
71. Id. at 1301 (citing Reconsideration Order, 3 F.C.C.R. 930 (1987)).
72. ACT I, 852 F.2d 1332, 1334 (1988) (citing In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of
Pennsylvania, 64 Rad.Reg.2d (P & F) 211, 219 n.47 (1987) (Reconsideration Order)).
73. Id. (citing Reconsideration Order, 64 Rad.Reg.2d at 217, 219 n.47).
74. ACT I, 852 F.2d at 1334.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1334-35.
77. Id. at 1340-41.
78. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); see supra part II.C for the Paci-
fica decision.
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general applicability.79 Pacifica, on the other hand, had estab-
lished a rule for specific application-the seven dirty words.
Because adjudication did not insulate the FCC from judicial
review, the court proceeded to consider the other issues.
The court of appeals first considered the question of vague-
ness. Realizing that the generic definition of indecen-
cy---"exposure of children to language that describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activi-
ties and organs"S°---was virtually the same as had been adopt-
ed by the Supreme Court in Pacifica, the court of appeals in-
ferred that the Supreme Court had not regarded the term "in-
decent" as so vague that persons "of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applica-
tion.""' In sum, the court of appeals concluded that "if accep-
tance of the FCC's generic definition of 'indecent' as capable of
surviving a vagueness challenge is not implicit in Pacifica, we
have misunderstood Higher Authority and welcome correc-
tion."82 Such a conclusion is most likely still correct because
the FCC has not changed its definition of "indecent," future
79. ACT I, 852 F.2d at 1337. The explanation for the regulatory change offered
by the FCC in its Reconsideration Order, was that it found
the deliberately-repeated-use-of-dirty-words policy "unduly narrow as a
matter of law" and inconsistent with its obligation responsibly to enforce
section 1464. The former approach permitted the unregulated broadcast of
any material that did not contain Carlin's "filthy words," no matter how
the material might affect children exposed to it. It made no legal or
policy sense, the FCC said, to regulate the Carlin monologue but not
"material that portrayed sexual or excretory activities or organs in as pa-
tently offensive a manner ... simply because it avoided certain words."
Id. at 1338 (citing Reconsideration Order, 64 Rad.Reg.2d at 214) (citations omitted)).
80. In re Pacifica, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975); Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726; see supra
part HA concerning the definition of indecency.
81. ACT I, 852 F.2d at 1339 (quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S.
385, 391 (1926)). The ACT I court found that
[t]he Commission now treats the nature of the material involved and the
time of day separately;, the time of a broadcast is pertinent to whether it
is actionable, not whether it is indecent. Nevertheless, a violation of
section 1464 must be predicated on the same components relevant under
the [In re Pacifica] formulation: whether material is indecent and wheth-
er it was broadcast when there was a reasonable risk of children in the
audience.
Id. at 1339 n.8 (citing Reconsideration Order 64 Rad.Reg.2d at 213 n.6).
82. Id. at 1339.
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courts upheld the definition, and the Supreme Court has consis-
tently denied certiorari to indecent broadcasting cas-
es-including recently denying review to ACT IIIR.83
In challenging the FCC's definition of "indecent" as
overbroad, the intervenors premised their argument on the
inability of "serious merit" to redeem material from indecency
status.' In holding that "serious merit" need not, in every in-
stance, immunize indecent material from FCC channeling au-
thority,85 the court of appeals realized that there may be in-
stances where protection of children may outweigh the "serious
merit." Furthermore, the FCC does not entirely disregard "seri-
ous merit."" Instead, the FCC considers "serious merit" rele-
vant in determining whether material is patently offensive, but
having merit does not make a broadcast per se not indecent.87
Reiterating that indecent material that is not obscene qualifies
for First Amendment protection whether or not it has serious
merit, the court of appeals qualified its view by stating that
children's access to indecent material may be regulated.88 Ad-
ditionally, "since the overall value of a work will not necessarily
alter the impact of certain words or phrases on children, the
FCC's approach is permissible . . [and] therefore, is not vul-
nerable to the charge that it is substantially overbroad."89
Having upheld the FCC's generic definition in light of its
purpose-"to permit the channeling of indecent material, in
order to shelter children from exposure to words and phrases
their parents regard as inappropriate for them to hear"'9 -the
court of appeals considered the FCC's "current thinking" regard-
ing the channeling hours. The petitioners argued that the chan-
83. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 701 (1996).
84. ACT 1, 852 F.2d at 1339.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1340 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968) (quoting
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944))) (stating that "even where there is
an invasion of protected freedoms 'the power of the state to control the conduct of
children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults.....
89. Id.
90. Id. (citing Reconsideration Order, 64 Rad.Reg. at 213 para. 2.).
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neling of indecent material to after midnight was arbitrary and
capricious, as it did not have an adequate basis in fact or ana-
lytical analysis.9' Petitioners also contended that the channel-
ing interfered with the First Amendment rights of adults to
hear and see indecent material. 2
Agreeing with the petitioners that, "in view of the curtail-
ment of broadcaster freedom and adult listener choice that
channeling entails, the Commission failed to consider fairly and
fully what time lines should be drawn," the court of appeals
vacated the FCC's rulings in Pacifica Foundation and Regents
of U.C.93 The court of appeals remanded these rulings to the
FCC for a thorough reconsideration of the times at which inde-
cent material may be aired, including a record of the size of the
radio audience involved and why it includes teens between the
ages of twelve to seventeen as part of the relevant age group.94
Additionally, the FCC was required to "afford broadcasters clear
notice of reasonably determined times at which indecent materi-
al safely may be aired." 5 Although the court of appeals vacat-
91. Id. (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
92. Id. at 1340-41.
93. Id. at 1341.
94. Id. at 1341-42. The court regarded evidence from ratings data indicating the
estimated numbers of children in the viewing audience at the times of the broadcasts
in question as insubstantial. Id. at 1341. As the court noted, there was little expla-
nation as to why the FCC changed the relevant age from 12 and under to under 18
and therefore instructed the FCC to "supply information on the listening habits of
children in that age range, or explain how it extrapolates relevant data for that pop-
ulation from the available ratings information." Id. at 1342.
95. Id. at 1343. The court had found that "the FCC itself has recognized that 'the
effect of [a case-by-case] approach may well be to cause broadcasters to forego the
broadcast of certain protected speech altogether, rather than to channel it to late
night hours." Id. at 1342 (citing Reconsideration Order, 64 Rad.Reg.2d at 219 n.47).
Thus, by being given clear notice, broadcasters may feel more willing to broadcast
such material. The FCC had also noted that a channeling decision must accommodate
the following competing interests:
(1) the government, which has a compelling interest in protecting chil-
dren from indecent material; (2) parents, who are entitled to decide
whether their children are exposed to such material if it is aired; (3)
broadcasters, who are entitled to air such material at times of day when
there is not a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience; and
(4) adult listeners, who have a right to see and hear programming that
is inappropriate for children but not obscene.
Id. (citing Reconsideration Order, 64 Rad.Reg.2d at 219 n.47).
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ed Pacifica Foundation and Regents of U.C., it found the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Pacifica dispositive to the
afffiming of the FCC's decision in Infinity." Because the
broadcast had occurred within the same hours as the broadcast
in Pacifica (6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.), there was no reason to
command a different result.97
3. ACT II: Action for Children's Television v. FCC8
Before the FCC could develop a better record to justify the
change in hours during which indecent material could be broad-
cast, Congress, at the urging of Senator Jesse Helms, inter-
vened. Two months after ACT I was decided, President Bush
signed a 1989 appropriations bill containing a rider that insti-
tuted a twenty-four-hour ban on section 1464 material.9 Ac-
cordingly, the FCC issued a rule prohibiting all broadcasts of
indecent material.'" The Commission also abandoned the ACT
I court's mandate to produce an adequate record.'' A panel of
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit granted the petitioners' motion to stay the ban. °2
While briefing on the validity of the ban was before the court of
appeals, Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC' was decided by
the United States Supreme Court. In Sable, the Supreme Court
found a similar ban on indecent commercial telephone messages
unconstitutional."° The court of appeals remanded to the FCC
to assemble relevant data supporting the total ban.0 5
96. Id. at 1341.
97. Id.
98. ACT II, 932 F.2d 1504.
99. Id. at 1507 (citing Pub. L. No. 100-459, § 608, 102 Stat. 2228 (1988)). The
rider read: "By January 31, 1989, the Federal Communications Commission shall
promulgate regulations in accordance with section 1464, title 18, United States Code,
to enforce the provisions of such section on a 24 hour per day basis." Id.
100. Id.; see Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Obscenity and Indecen-
cy in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 4 F.C.C.R. 457 (1988); Finch, supra note 70 at 1305.
101. ACT II, 932 F.2d at 1507.
102. Id.
103. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
104. Id. at 131 (stating that "[b]ecause the statute's denial of adult access to tele-
phone messages which are indecent but not obscene far exceeds that which is neces-
sary to limit the access of minors to such messages, we hold that the ban does not
survive constitutional scrutiny.").
105. ACT II, 932 F.2d at 1507 (citing Action for Children's Television v. FCC, No.
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After receiving and reviewing comments, the FCC issued a
report explaining how the twenty-four-hour ban comports with
Sable."6 The FCC found that a "reasonable risk that signifi-
cant numbers of children ages 17 and under listen to radio and
view television at all times' without 'active' parental supervi-
sion."107 Therefore, "the Commission concluded that no alter-
native to a total ban would effectuate the government's compel-
ling interest in protecting children from broadcast indecen-
cy."10
8
Petitioners subsequently challenged the FCC's action on the
basis that the FCC's definition of indecency was unconstitution-
ally vague and overbroad."° Because the court of appeals had
rejected the claim that the definition was vague and overbroad
in ACT I, the court again succinctly rejected it. 110 Petitioner's
core challenge was to the constitutionality of a total ban on the
broadcast of indecent material. The challenge was based on two
contentions. First, that under United States Supreme Court and
circuit precedent, the government may not completely suppress
protected speech in any medium."' Second, even if a total ban
could be justified, the FCC's action failed to satisfy the strict
scrutiny standard as accorded in Sable."
Basing its decision on ACT I and Sable Communications, the
court of appeals found that a total ban on the broadcast of
indecent material was unconstitutional."8 The court's previous
holding in ACT I had required that the FCC identify some
reasonable period in which indecent material may be
broadcast." The fact that Congress had mandated a total ban
did not alter the court's "view that, under ACT I, such a prohi-
88-1916 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 13, 1989) (remanding record to the FCC for a "ftl and fair
hearing on the issue of the propriety of indecent broadcasting")).
106. Id. (citing Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18
U.S.C. § 1464, 5 F.C.C.R. 5297, 5297 (1990)).
107. Id. (quoting Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18
U.S.C. § 1464, 5 F.C.C.R. at 5297, 5306 (1990)).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1507-08.
111. Id. at 1508.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1509.
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bition cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.""5 The court's
decision returned the FCC to the position it occupied after ACT
L Specifically the court directed the FCC,
in "redetermin[ing], after a full and fair hearing,... the
times at which indecent material may be broadcast," to
carefully review and address the specific concerns [it] raised
in ACT I: among them, the appropriate definitions of "chil-
dren" and "reasonable risk" for channeling purposes, the
paucity of station- or program-specific audience data ex-
pressed as a percentage of the relevant age group popula-
tion, and the scope of the government's interest in regulat-
ing indecent broadcasts.11
For those reasons, the case was remanded to the FCC for fur-
ther proceedings in accordance with ACT II, and hence ACT
1.117
4. ACT III: Action for Children's Television v. FCC..
Once again, the FCC was not able to begin hearings as di-
rected by the court of appeals before Congress intervened. Con-
gress passed the Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, which
in section 16(a), required the FCC to promulgate a new rule
barring indecent material during the broadcast hours from 6:00
a.m. to midnight, but allowing public broadcast stations that go
off the air at or before midnight to broadcast indecent material
between 10:00 p.m. and midnight.119 The FCC, as instructed
by Congress, issued a notice of proposed rulemaking 2 ° and a
115. Id. Looking to Sable, the court acknowledged the protected status of indecent
speech and that any governmental regulations on the content of that speech must
satisfy a strict constitutional standard. Id. The court also referred to the FCC's previ-
ous position that it "may only do that which is necessary to restrict children's access
to indecent broadcasts" and "may not go further so as to preclude access by adults
who are interested in seeing or hearing such material." Id. (quoting In re Infinity
Broadcasting Corp. of Pa., 3 F.C.C.R. 930, 931 (1987)).
116. Id. at 1510.
117. Id.
118. ACT III, 11 F.3d 170.
119. Pub. L. No. 102-356, § 16(a), 106 Stat. 949, 954 (1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 303 note) [hereinafter Telecommunications Act of 1992].
120. Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464,
7 F.C.C.R. 6464 (1992) (stating that "[tihe focus of th[e ensuing rulemaking] proceed-
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report and order" adopting the new mandate. The codified
rulemaking reads:
(a) No licensee of a radio or television broadcast station
shall broadcast any material which is obscene. (b) No li-
censee of a public broadcast station... that goes off the
air at or before 12 midnight shall broadcast on any day
between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. any material which is indecent.
(c) No licensee of a radio or television broadcast station not
described in paragraph (b) of this section shall broadcast on
any day between 6 a.m. and 12 midnight any material
which is indecent.'
Petitioners sought review of the regulations and section 16(a)
charging that they were unconstitutional because they were not
tailored narrowly enough to meet First Amendment standards
and because the exception for public broadcasting stations that
go off the air on or before midnight violates the equal protec-
tion of the laws." The court of appeals stayed the enforce-
ment of the regulation pending the outcome of the case.'
The court first considered whether the FCC's stated purpose
of protecting privacy interests was sufficiently compelling to
withstand strict scrutiny. Although recognizing the United
States Supreme Court's finding in Pacifica that broadcasting
was a uniquely pervasive presence and invaded the privacy of
one's home, the court of appeals reasoned that the holding in
Pacifica was not based "on a general privacy rationale applica-
ble to adults and children alike."' Refraining from extending
ing [was] ... confined to the matter of updating the Commission's record pertaining
to the governmental interest in restricting the broadcasting of indecent material.").
121. Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464,
8 F.C.C.R. 704 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Report and Order]. The 1993 Report and
Order articulated the government's interests as (i) "ensuring that parents have an
opportunity to supervise their children's listening and viewing of over-the-air broad-
casts, regardless of whether parents choose to exercise that supervision," (ii) "the
government's independent interest in ensuring the well being of minors" regardless of
parental supervision, and (iii) "the right of all members of the public to be free of
indecent material in the privacy of their homes;" ACT III, 11 F.3d at 173 (quoting
1993 Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 705-706 10, 14).
122. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (1993).
123. ACT III, 11 F.3d at 173.
124. Id.
125. ACT I, 11 F.3d at 174-75.
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a captive audience rationale, 6 the court found that the
government's true concern is the protection of children, not
adults, from indecent broadcasting. 7 Therefore, the court re-
jected reliance on a generalized privacy rationale to justify
regulation of indecent broadcasting."
Although the court of appeals did not find that privacy was a
compelling interest, it did find two compelling interests in pro-
tecting children from indecent material: (1) "helping parents
supervise their children," and (2) "shielding children from expo-
sure to indecent material regardless of parental supervi-
sion."' Once a compelling interest was established, the court
needed to determine whether the regulation--6:00 a.m. to mid-
night ban on indecent broadcasting-was narrowly tailored. The
court concluded that the "government did not properly weigh
viewers' and listeners' First Amendment rights when balancing
the competing interests to determine the widest safe-harbor
period consistent with the protection of children."3 ' Also, like
in ACT I, the court of appeals could not detect any "reasoned
analysis" supporting the promulgated safe harbor.''
After considering the competing interests of parental supervi-
sion, shielding minors from indecent material, and the First
Amendment rights of adults, the court of appeals determined
that the regulation was not narrowly tailored. Concerning the
interest of parental supervision, the court of appeals found that
the government had not produced any evidence that suggested
the effectiveness of parental supervision varies by the time of
day or night. 2 Nor was there any evidence produced that
showed that the safe harbor was crafted to assist parents at
specific times when they would need help from the government
to supervise their children.133 Thus, this interest did not justi-
126. Id. at 175. For a discussion of the captive audience rationale see Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
127. ACT II, 11 F.3d at 176.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 176-77.
130. Id. at 177.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 178.
133. Id. In fact, the court reasoned that "one could intuitively assume that as the
evening hours wear on, parents would be better situated to keep track of their
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fy the regulation, as no evidence showed that the safe harbor
protects children from indecent material at times when parental
supervision is likely to be least effective.'
Next, the court of appeals held that the government's compel-
ling interest in shielding all minors, regardless of age, from
exposure to indecent material did not justify the safe harbor
period." In fact, the court found that the interest in protect-
ing a minor fades as that minor matures."6 Previously, the
United States Supreme Court in Erznoznik v. City of Jackson-
ville held that the values protected by the First Amendment
were no less applicable when the government seeks to control
the flow of indecent material to minors.3 7 Although Pacifica
held that the government could prevent young children's expo-
sure to indecent material at a time when the FCC defined
children as under the age of twelve, the ACT III court did not
read Pacifica as a wholesale dismissal of older minors' First
Amendment rights explicitly recognized by Erznoznik.'
Hence, the court of appeals pronounced that the FCC must
"adduce data which permits a more finely tuned trade-off be-
tween adults' First Amendment rights and the government's
interest in protecting children from indecent material as that
interest varies in importance with their age."39
Finally, the court of appeals turned to the First Amendment
rights of adults. The court found that there was no evidence in
the record that the government had narrowly tailored its pro-
tection of children to avoid unnecessary infringement on the
First Amendment rights of adults.' In an attempt to show
children's viewing and listening habits." Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 180.
136. Id.
137. Id. (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 214 (1975)). In
Erznoznik, the Supreme Court rejected the government's general interest in protecting
minors from films containing nudity, and held that "Is]peech that is neither obscene
as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed
solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks un-
suitable for them." Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 213-14 (rejecting a Jacksonville statute re-
stricting the showing of films containing nudity at a drive-in).
138. ACT III, 11 F.3d at 179.
139. Id. at 180.
140. Id. at 181.
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that adults' rights had not been unnecessarily infringed, the
FCC pointed out that there were alternative sources available
to adults from which to receive indecent material."4 The court
rejected this alternative sources argument, finding that it did
not relieve the government from considering the First Amend-
ment rights of the broadcast audience.' Additionally, the
court determined that the FCC had exclusively focused on the
number of children in the audience which indicated that the
government had "failed to balance its child-oriented compelling
interests against the countervailing First Amendment rights of
adult listeners and viewers."' By requiring a record and evi-
dence to support the FCC's general conclusions, the court essen-
tially placed the FCC back at the same point as in ACT I.
In concurrence, Judge Edwards commented on the problems
with the government's view that the regulation rests on vague
notions that too many parents are either unavailable to super-
vise their children or are inept at the task of parenting.'
First, Edwards concluded that the "Government tramples heed-
lessly on parents' rights to rear their children as they see fit
and to inculcate in them moral values of the parents' choos-
ing."" Second, Edwards asserted that in acting to limit
children's exposure to indecent material, the government's stat-
ed purpose rested on inconsistent, confused and possibly false
premises. ' Furthermore, Edwards contended that "if facilita-
tion of 'parental supervision' is the principal interest to be
served, then a good argument can be made that ensuring the
availability of "blocking devices-to permit parents to block
their children from seeing and hearing indecent material in
their absence-is the most that Government ought to do." 4 '
141. Id. Such alternative sources include "audio and video tapes, cable television,
wireless cable or subscription satellite television services." 1993 Report and Order, 8
F.C.C.R. 704, 709 $ 30 (citing Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecen-
cy in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 5 F.C.C.R. 5297, 5208-09 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 Report and
Order]).
142. ACT III, 11 F.3d at 181.
143. Id. at 182.
144. Id. at 184 (Edwards, J., concurring).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 185 (stating that ill effects of indecent material on children have yet to
be unearthed); see infra part IV for the possibility that the assumptions about the
effects of indecent material on children are inaccurate.
147. Id. See infra part V for a discussion of the possibility that blocking devices
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III. ACT IIIR:1' REHEARING ACT III
Upon remand of ACT III to the FCC, the FCC successfully
requested that the D.C. Circuit rehear ACT III." At the re-
hearing, the petitioners presented three challenges to the con-
stitutionality of section 16(a) of the Telecommunications Act of
1992" ° and its implementing regulations. While the challenge
to the generic definition of indecency as unconstitutionally
vague was dismissed as meritless,"5' the following two chal-
lenges were considered: (1) that the statute and regulations
imposing restrictions on indecent broadcasts were not narrowly
tailored to the Government's compelling interest, and therefore
violated the First Amendment; and (2) that "section 16(a) un-
constitutionally discriminate[d] among categories of broadcasters
by distinguishing the times during which certain public and
commercial broadcasters may air indecent material. 52
A. The First Amendment Challenge
The court of appeals recognized that despite the fact that
traditional broadcast media are properly subject to more regula-
tion than is generally permissible under the First Amendment,
strict scrutiny should be applied when assessing the constitu-
tionality of such regulations.'53 The strict scrutiny standard in
broadcasting required that a statute regulating the content of
constitutionally protected speech, in order to promote a compel-
ling interest, be narrowly tailored, using the least restrictive
means to further that interest.'5
such as the V-chip may be an alternative to regulation.
148. ACT IIIR, 58 F.3d 654.
149. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 15 F.3d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994), vacating
and granting reh'g to ACT III, 11 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
150. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
151. ACT IIIR, 58 F.3d at 659.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 660.
154. Id. at 663-64 (citing Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 429 U.S. 115, 126
(1989)).
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1. Compelling Interests
The court of appeals found independently compelling the
government's interests in (1) supporting parental supervision of
what children see and hear on the public airwaves, and (2) the
well-being of minors.'55 Although recognizing the first interest,
in regard to the second, petitioners argued that because "'no
causal nexus has been established between broadcast indecency
and any physical or psychological harm to minors' that interest
[the well-being of children] is 'too insubstantial to justify sup-
pressing indecent material at times when parents are available
to supervise their children.'"' 56 The court of appeals responded
by questioning the effectiveness of parental supervision... and
by pointing out that the United States Supreme Court recog-
nized that the Government's interest extends beyond shielding
children from physical and psychological harm.55 Finally, the
court of appeals found that "the Government's dual interest in
assisting parents and protecting minors necessarily extends
beyond merely channeling broadcast indecency to those hours
when parents" can supervise their children.'59
155. Id. at 661. The court did not consider the third interest identified by the
FCC: the protection of the home against intrusion by offensive broadcast. Id. at 660-
61.
156. Id. at 661 (quoting Joint Brief for Petitioners at 32, 33). See infra part IV for
an analysis on the nexus between indecent material and harm.
157. Id. The court recognized that "parents, no matter how attentive, sincere or
knowledgeable, are not in a position to really exercise control' over what their chil-
dren see on television." Id. (quoting In re Action for Children's Television, 50
F.C.C.2d 17, 26 (1974)). The court also looked to two studies which found that multi-
ple televisions and radios were present in most households and that more than half
of the children had a television and radio in their bedroom. Id.
158. Id. at 661-63. Previously, the Supreme Court had not required scientific dem-
onstration of psychic harm when protecting high school students from indecent speech
at an assembly. Id. at 662 (citing Bethel School District No. 43 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 682 (1986)). The Court also stated that it "'di[d] not demand of legislatures sci-
entifically certain criteria of legislation." Id. at 662 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 642-43 (1968)). Additionally, the court concluded that "Congress does
not need the testimony of psychiatrists and social scientists in order to take note of
the coarsening of impressionable minds that can result from a persistent exposure to
sexually explicit material" that is indecent. Id.
159. Id. at 663.
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2. Least Restrictive Means
Petitioners argued that section 16(a) of the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1992 is not narrowly drawn to the government's
interest in protecting children from broadcasting indecency for
two reasons. 160 First, petitioners asserted that the class of
children to be protected should be limited to those under the
age of twelve. 6 Second, petitioners argued that the "safe har-
bor" was not narrowly tailored because it failed to take proper
account of adults' First Amendment rights and because of the
chilling effect of the 6:00 a.m. to midnight ban on the programs
aired during the evening "prime time" hours.6 2
Both ACT I and ACT II directed the FCC to address the
definition of "children.""6 The court of appeals accepted the
three reasons the FCC had offered in support of its definition of
children to include "children ages 17 and under."' The rea-
sons given by the FCC were: "Other federal statutes designed
to protect children from indecent speech use the same standard;
most States have laws penalizing persons who disseminate
sexually explicit materials to children ages 17 and under; and
several Supreme Court decisions have sustained the constitu-
tionality of statutes protecting children ages 17 and under."'65
Additionally, the court considered that the sponsor of section
16(a), Senator Byrd, had made specific reference to the FCC's
finding that "'there is a reasonable risk that significant num-
bers of children ages 17 and under listen to radio and view
television at all times of the day or night.'""6 Therefore, the
FCC had finally complied with at least a portion of the ACT I
and ACT 11 directives to supply evidence to justify its
conclusory findings.
160. Id. at 664.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. (citations omitted).
166. Id. (quoting 138 CONG. REC. S7308 (1992) (statement of Sen. Byrd)).
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Next the court of appeals turned to the constitutionality of
the ban itself. The court only addressed the 6 a.m. to midnight
ban because if that ban could survive constitutional scrutiny,
then the reduction of the ban by two hours would remain nar-
rowly tailored.'67 The question considered by the court of ap-
peals was "what period [would] serve the compelling govern-
mental interest without unduly infringing on the adult
population's right to see and hear indecent material."6 ' First,
the court concluded that there was a "reasonable risk that large
numbers of children would be exposed to any indecent material
broadcast between 6:00 a.m. and midnight."'69 Second, the
court recognized that while the number of adults listening to
radio and watching television after midnight was admittedly
small, it was not insignificant. 7 ° Coupled with alternative
means of viewing or listening to indecent material available to
adults, the court found "that a midnight to 6:00 a.m. safe har-
bor [took] adequate account of adults' First Amendment
rights." 7' The court of appeals went further, saying that
"there may be a range of safe harbors, each of which [would]
satisfy the 'narrowly tailored' requirement of the First Amend-
ment."
172
B. The Public Broadcaster Exception
Public stations that sign off the air at or before midnight,
unlike any other stations, are permitted by section 16(a) and
regulations pursuant to that section to broadcast indecent mate-
rial after 10:00 p.m.173 Congress provided no real explanation
for this special treatment, except for accommodating those pub-
167. Id. The court offered two reasons for looking only at the 6 a.m. to midnight
ban. First, in addressing the "narrowly tailored" issue, the parties had concentrated
on the 6 a.m. to midnight ban. Id. Second, the principles applied to determine the
constitutionality of the 6 a.m. to midnight will apply equally to the other hours. Id.
168. Id. at 665.
169. Id. The court came to this conclusion after considering data collected by the
FCC and republished in the Congressional Record.
170. Id. at 666.
171. Id. (rejecting petitioners' arguments of a chilling effect and of the ban occur-
ring when children are presumably subject to strict adult supervision).
172. Id. at 667.
173. Pub. L. No. 102-356, § 16(a)(1), 106 Stat. 954 (1992); 47 C.F.R § 73.3999.
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lic stations that go off the air at or before midnight.'74 The
FCC did little more to explain the preference.'75 The court of
appeals concluded that the exception was a result of a misun-
derstanding of its directive in ACT II-that the FCC must
"afford broadcasters clear notice of reasonably determined times
at which indecent material safely may be aired"-which did not
require that every station be treated equally. Additionally,
neither Congress or the FCC explained how the disparate treat-
ment accorded public stations related to the government's com-
pelling interest.77 Because there was no explanation as to the
disparate treatment, the court held that the section was "uncon-
stitutional insofar as it bar[red] the broadcasting of indecent
speech between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and midnight."78 Ac-
cordingly, the court remanded the case to the FCC with instruc-
tions to limit its ban on the broadcasting of indecent programs
to the period from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.79
C. Dissent by Chief Judge Edwards..
Once again, Chief Judge Edwards wrote separately, this time
in dissent. Edwards found that section 16(a) of the Telecommu-
174. ACT IIIR, 58 F.3d at 667. The court considered the following as the only
explanation: "In order to accommodate public television and radio stations that go off
the air at or before 12 midnight, the FCC's enforcement authority would extend [to]
the hour of 10 o'clock p.m. for those stations." Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 138
CONG. REC. S7308 (statement of Sen. Byrd)).
175. Id. The FCC gave the following explanation:
In balancing the interests at stake, it appears reasonable to afford public
broadcasters that do not operate during the regular safe harbor time
period at least some opportunity to air indecent material as opposed to
forcing them to extend their broadcast day beyond that which is economi-
cally feasible. Congress carved out this exception apparently as a kind of
"rough accommodation" of its concerns for public broadcasters.
Id. (quoting 1993 Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 704, 710 (1993)).
176. Id. at 669. (quoting ACT II, 932 F.2d 1504, 1509 (1991)).
177. Id. at 668-69. The present case was distinguished from Alliance for Communi-
ty Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 127-28 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In Alliance, the same court
allowed the FCC to require the segregation and blocking of indecent programs on
leased-access channels while not imposing a similar restriction on public access chan-
nels. 56 F.3d at 129.
178. ACT IIIR, 58 F.3d at 669.
179. Id. at 669-70.
180. Id. at 670-83 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting).
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nications Act of 1992.s was unconstitutional for three rea-
sons. First, Edwards found that the government's asserted in-
terests were irreconcilably in conflict.8 2 Second, Edwards felt
that the government did not meet the Supreme Court's doctrine
of providing evidence of harm before enacting speech restrictive
regulation because the government showed no evidence that
indecent broadcasting harmed children." Finally, Edwards
concluded that the least restrictive means had not been em-
ployed to promote the interests asserted.' 84
Before considering the three reasons for dissent, Chief Judge
Edwards considered the reasons why broadcast media had been
more heavily regulated than non-broadcast media, finding those
reasons inapplicable today.' First, Edwards found that the
spectrum scarcity rationale was no longer appropriate. 8 6 Addi-
tionally, Edwards determined that the characteristic of broad-
casting espoused in Pacifica, that "broadcasting is uniquely ac-
cessible to children," failed to distinguish it from cable which
has the same First Amendment rights as other media.18
181. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
182. ACT IIIR, 58 F.3d at 672 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 672-77.
186. Id. at 675. The spectrum scarcity theory is based on both economic and tech-
nological scarcity theories. The Supreme Court first offered an economic scarcity theo-
ry in Red Lion finding that "[w]here there are substantially more individuals who
want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is ideal to posit an un-
bridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every indi-
vidual to speak, write, or publish." Red Lion Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 388 (1969). The technological scarcity theory offered by the Court recognized the
need to prevent "overcrowd[ing of] the spectrum." Id. at 389. Furthermore, the Court
in Red Lion held that "[blecause of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government
is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be
expressed on this unique medium." Id. at 390.
Edwards rejected both the economic and technological scarcity theories. ACT
IIIR, 58 F.3d at 675-76 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting). Technological scarcity can now be
overcome by devoting more resources toward the development of the electromagnetic
spectrum. Id. at 675 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting). Economic scarcity, Edwards argues,
is rendered superfluous by the development of cable and other alternatives. Id. at
675.
187. Id. at 676.
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Chief Judge Edwards reiterated what he stated in his concur-
ring opinion in ACT III, that the government's interests
were irreconcilably in conflict. 8 ' Edwards felt that the FCC
could not "simultaneously seek to facilitate parental supervision
over their children's exposure to indecent programming and at
the same time protect all children from indecent speech by
imposing a flat ban on indecent programming from the hours of
6 a.m. to midnight."90 Furthermore, Edwards argued that be-
cause parents may not agree with the FCC as to what is inde-
cent, nor whether indecent programming may be appropriate in
certain circumstances, nor at what age children may be exposed
to indecent programming, the government was essentially in-
truding into the rights of parents to raise their children as they
see fit.' 1
Chief Judge Edwards looked to Turner Broadcasting Systems
v. FCC 2 to support his claim that a more definite harm must
be posited.' 3 In TBS, the Supreme Court required that the
government "must demonstrate that the recited harms are real,
not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alle-
viate these harms in a direct and material way."' Edwards
found that the FCC had not fulfilled this requirement.'95
Finally, Chief Judge Edwards considered whether the least
restrictive means had been employed. Edwards failed to find
any "data on actual parental supervision, parental preferences,
or on the effectiveness of parental supervision at different hours
of the day and night." 6 Additionally, Edwards cited the
FCC's own assurances to the court that blocking technology, in
which a chip placed in television sets prevents certain shows
from being transmitted, is available. 7 Once again, Edwards
188. ACT III, 11 F.3d at 183-86 (Edwards, J., concurring).
189. ACT M1IR, 58 F.3d at 678 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 678-79.
192. Turner Broadcasting Systems v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994) [hereinafter
TBS].
193. ACT IIIR, 58 F.3d at 680 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting).
194. Id. (quoting TBS, 114 S. Ct. at 2470).
195. Id. at 682.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 683 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 62).
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found that the Government had failed to fulfill the requirement
of least restrictive means when creating the regulation.'98
D. Analysis of the Decision
The court of appeals in ACT IJIR finally concluded that chan-
neling indecent broadcasting was constitutional. It appears that
had the FCC complied earlier with the order in ACT I to devel-
op evidence supporting its definition of children and justifying
the time of the safe harbor, the court would have upheld the
regulations. No new arguments were presented, and in fact, the
court relied on similar reasoning, as in previous holdings, to
come to its decision. However, in ACT IIIR, the FCC finally
supplied data on both sides of the balance-adults' rights and
the government's compelling interest to protect children. The
court of appeals found that the balance tilted towards the com-
pelling interest.
The discrepancy between public broadcasters was an easy one
for the court of appeals to decide. Similar to the lack of evi-
dence problem the FCC had in previous ACT cases, there was
no record as to why the public broadcasters should be treated
differently on the basis of what time went off the air. There-
fore, the disparate treatment was not as justified as it would
have to be to overcome strict scrutiny. One wonders how Con-
gress could have thought that such a provision could possibly
withstand a court challenge.
198. Id.
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IV. QUESTIONED ASSUMPTIONS?
The regulation of indecent broadcasting has hinged upon the
assumption that indecent material is harmful to children.'9
Social scientists, the petitioners in the discussed cases, and
D.C. Circuit Judge Edwards in his concurring opinion in ACT
III and dissenting opinion in ACT IIIR, have challenged this
important assumption. As of 1992, there had been no scientific
studies on the effects of children's exposure to indecent
language.00 In fact, one researcher found that "[no known
social values can be shown which support the need to keep
children away from indecent language."20'
Another group of researchers found that empirical research
provided no reasonable evidence to suggest that harmful effects
result from exposure to indecent material.0 2 That group found
that the few studies that have examined exposure to sexual
images found on broadcast television only suggest that these
images have a limited effect-increased knowledge regarding
sexual terms, but no evidence of changes in beliefs, attitudes, or
values regarding sexual practices, nor changes in actual behav-
ior.0 ' The researchers came to three conclusions: (1) the few
studies on the effect of exposure to indecent material have
shown no effect or harm to children under the age of eighteen;
(2) "there is serious reason to doubt that exposure to [indecent]
material has an effect on children up to age 12 in view of the
general sexual illiteracy of this age group, their limited ability
199. Edward Donnerstein et al., On the Regulation of Broadcast Indecency to Pro-
tect Children, 36 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 111, 111 (1992); see Jeremy
Harris Lipschultz, Conceptual Problems of Broadcast Indecency Policy and Application,
COMM. & L., June 1992, at 14 (stating that "[alt the heart of the government's 'legiti-
mate interest' in the protection of children is the assumption that pornography can
lead to negative social outcomes.").
200. Donnerstein et al., supra note 199, at 111.
201. Lipschultz, supra note 199, at 27.
202. Donnerstein et al., supra note 199, at 111.
203. Id. at 114. The findings were from an experiment on high school students
randomly assigned to view excerpts of television programs depicting- 1) prostitution,
2) married intercourse, 3) unmarried intercourse, and 4) homosexuality. Id. at 113.
(citing GREENBERG ET AL., MEDIA, SEX, AND THE ADOLESCENT (1991); Greenberg et al.,
Adolescents and Their Reactions to Television Sex (1988) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Michigan State University Department of Communications)).
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to understand sexual references, and their probable lack of
interest in indecent material;" and (3) adolescents aged thirteen
to seventeen are likely to have developed moral standards
which enable them to deal with broadcast content more crit-
ically."'
Although the previously cited studies were over three years
old, there has been a recent study considering discrepancies
between the legal code and community standards for sex and
violence." 5 The study found that the criminal code demands
punishment of certain consenting sexual depictions, although
community members tolerate the material and feel such materi-
al requires no punishment."6 According to the researchers,
"[t]he discrepancy between community tolerance and the ob-
scenity code may exist because sexually explicit depictions of
consensual behavior are no longer perceived as harmful by
community members." °7 Although the study focused on films
prosecuted in an obscenity case, the same conclusions are likely
to hold in indecency cases. The films were found not to appeal
to a prurient interest, nor were they patently offensive."' Be-
cause the definition of indecency employed by the FCC requires
that a film be "patently offensive," the films did not fall under
the FCC's definition.
If these studies are valid, then the petitioners may have been
correct in the ACT cases. The studies also point to the conclu-
sion that the patently offensive standard used by the FCC may
not correspond with the community's patently offensive stan-
dard. One would think that the FCC should closely mirror
society's prevailing views on patently offensive material, or else
204. Donnerstein et al., supra note 199, at 115-16.
205. Daniel Linz et al., Discrepancies between the Legal Code and Community
Standards for Sex and Violence: An Empirical Challenge to Traditional Assumptions
in Obscenity Law, 29 LAW & SocY REv. 127 (1995). The study was undertaken to
investigate lay persons' perceptions of sexually explicit and violent materials in an
American community. Id. at 127-28. The participants were shown one of three
films-sexually explicit, violent, and control-which they were asked questions about.
Id. The study was submitted as evidence in United States v. Ellwest Stero Theaters of
Memphis, No. 89-20254 (W.D. Tenn. 1990). Id. at 137.
206. Id. at 157.
207. Id. at 160. The researchers did find that violence has been cited as having
the most potentially damaging societal effects. Id.
208. Linz et al., supra note 205, at 155.
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run the risk of being found to have overbroad regulations and
enforcement standards.
V. ALTERNATIVE PROTECTION: THE V-CHIP AND THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
A. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
Recent years have seen the explosion of the Internet and
other technologies. With the expanding computer and electronic
technologies, there have been hopes that they might solve some
of society problems, including moral decay. In fact, there is
hope in Congress that these technologies can be employed to
block indecent programming. On February 8, 1996, President
Clinton signed the Telecommunications Act of 1996.9 This
Act includes requirements for a "V-chip" to allow parents to
block certain television shows and a rating system for television
shows to help parents choose which shows to block.2 10
Section 551(a) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 con-
tained a list of findings in order to justify its provisions. These
findings included:
(1) Television influences children's perceptions of the values
and behavior that are common and acceptable in society. (2)
[The tielevision [industry] ... should follow practices...
that take into consideration... [the] uniquely pervasive
presence [television has] in the lives of American children.
(3) The average American child is exposed to 25 hours of
television each week and some children are exposed to as
much as 11 hours of television a day. (4) Studies have
shown that children exposed to violent video programming
at a young age have a higher tendency for violent and ag-
gressive behavior later in life than children not so exposed,
and that children exposed to violent video programming are
prone to assume that acts of violence are acceptable behav-
ior ... (6) Studies indicate that children are affected by the
pervasiveness and casual treatment of sexual material on
209. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C. (1996)).
210. Id., § 551, 110 Stat. at 139 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303(w),(x) (1996)).
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television, eroding the ability of parents to develop responsi-
ble attitudes and behavior in their children. (7) Parents ex-
press grave concern over violent and sexual [television]
programming and strongly support technology that would
give them greater control to block [programs] ... they
consider harmful to their children. (8) There is a compelling
governmental interest in empowering parents to limit the
negative influences of [television] programming that is
harmful to children. (9) Providing parents with timely infor-
mation about the nature of upcoming [television] program-
ming and with the technological tools that allow them easi-
ly to block violent, sexual, or other programming that they
believe harmful to their children is a nonintrusive and
narrowly tailored means of achieving that compelling gov-
ernmental interest. 1 '
Section 551(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 re-
quired that a television rating system be established.1 The
system will be implemented either by the television industry or
the FCC. Through the use of an advisory committee, the system
will be implemented one year after the date of enactment of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 by the FCC, only if the FCC
determines the following:
[I]n consultation with appropriate public interest groups
and interested individuals from the private sector, that dis-
tributors of [television] programming have not, [within one
year]-(A) established voluntary rules for rating [television]
programming that contains sexual, violent, or other indecent
material about which parents should be informed before it
is displayed to children, and such rules are acceptable to
the Commission; and (B) agree voluntarily to broadcast
signals that contain ratings of such programming.2 13
The advisory committee established by the FCC will create
"guidelines and recommend[ ] procedures for the identification
and rating of [television] programming that contains sexual,
violent, or other indecent material.... "'14 The committee will
211. Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 551(a), 110 Stat. at 139-40 (1996).
212. Id., § 551(b), 110 Stat. at 140-41 (1996).
213. Id. § 551(e)(1), 110 Stat. at 142.
214. Id. § 551(b)(1), 110 Stat. at 140; Why the Markey Chip Won't Hurt You,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug. 14, 1995, at 10 [hereinafter Markey Chip]; Markey
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be composed of "parents, television broadcasters, television
programming producers, cable operators, appropriate public
interest groups, and other interested individuals from the pri-
vate sector and... [be] fairly balanced in terms of political
affiliation, . . . points of view represented, and... functions to
be performed by the committee."" Finally, distributors of
television programs will be required to transmit the ratings so
that parents can block programs that they consider inappropri-
ate for their children. '
In order to prevent the government from being involved in
the rating process-an "indispensable conviction" of the entire
television industry 1 ---the television industry quickly reacted
and agreed to implement their own rating system. ' s This ac-
tion was a departure from television broadcasters long-standing
opposition to a national rating system and the V-chip.2 The
ratings will be determined by the distributor of each program,
not the program producers,22 and will resemble movie ratings
of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA).22' There
will be an industry review and "oversight monitoring process,
which from time to time will examine specific programs and
then comment on whether or not these ratings were appropriate
under the canopy of guidelines" created by the industry.2"
Wins on V-Chip, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug. 7, 1995, at 10; Christopher Stem,
Face-off on the V-Chip, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 2, 1995, at 19 [hereinafter Face-
oft].
215. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 551(b), 110 Stat. at 140; 141 CONG. REC.
H8485 (1995).
216. Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 551(b)(1), 110 Stat. at 140.
217. Jack Valenti, Delivers Remarks After Meeting with Entertainment Executives
on Violence on T.V. *18 (Feb. 29, 1996) (transcript available at 1996 WL 88309) (Jack
Valenti is the Chief Executive Officer of the Motion Picture Association of America.)
218. Id.
219. Christopher Stem, Broadcasters Seek V-Chip-Less Solution, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, July 24, 1995, at 17; Face-off, supra note 216, at 19. However, broadcasters
had supported other sorts of blocking devices including: V318 TV Lock-Out,
TeleCommander, Intelevision, TV Guardian, TimeSlot, SuperVision, TV Allowance, and
Multimedia. Id. at 17. For a description of these devices, see id.
220. Valenti, supra note 217 at *16; T.V. Ratings Brought About by Unprecedented
Cooperation, COlMI. DAILY, Mar. 1, 1996, available in WESTLAW, 1996 WL 2365923
[hereinafter Cooperation].
221. Cooperation, supra note 220; Lewis M. Andrews, Private Ratings, NAT'L REV.,
Sept. 25, 1995, at 82.
222. Valenti, supra note 217, at *17; see Cooperation, supra note 222.
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In order to facilitate the spread of the V-chip, the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996 requires that all televisions with a
screen thirteen inches or greater sold in the United States be
equipped with the blocking device."' After consulting the rat-
ings guidebook, the owners of the television will be able to
block certain shows by programming the V-chip with a remote
control.2" The V-chip would then read the rating transmitted
to the television for each show and then block it if so pro-
grammed by the owner," working much like a VCR does for
VCR-Plus codes." 6
Finally, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides, in
section 561, for expedited review.227 In anticipation of constitu-
tional challenges, this provision would help implement the Act
with some finality as quickly as possible. Challengers are given
"only a year to make their case, so the V-chip won't die a slow
death while stuck in court. " "2 Thus far, there have been no
challenges to the V-chip, which NBC West Coast President Don
Ohlmeyer has described as "unfortunate."2"
223. Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 551(c), 110 Stat. at 140; Markey Wins on
V-Chip, supra note 214, at 10; Face-off, supra note 214; Andrews, supra note 223, at
81-82.
224. 141 CoNG. REC. S12209 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) (quoting Michelle
Quinn, V-chip Still Only a Vision-Despite All the Talk, It Doesn't Exist, S.F. CHRON.,
July 28, 1995, at B1).
225. Id.
226. Andrews, supra note 221, at 83.
227. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 561, 110 Stat. at 142-43 ("[A]ny civil action
challenging the constitutionality [of the Act] . . . shall be heard by a district court of
3 judges convened pursuant to the provisions of section 2284 of title 28, United
States Code.").
228. Kinney Littlefield, Violence Study Spurs on the V-Chip's Fans, THE ORANGE
COUNTY REG., Feb. 11, 1996, at F7; see 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1994).
229. Jenny Hontz et al., Programmers Wonder How Much This is Going to Hurt,
ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Mar. 4, 1996, at 27 ("Mr. Ohlmeyer said it is 'unfortunate' the
networks have not filed suit to challenge the v-chip.")
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B. "Power-to-the-Parents" or a "Television Condom?"
Whereas President Clinton has described the V-chip as a
"power-to-the-parents technology monitor," ° others have con-
temptuously referred to it as a "television condom."2"' During
debates in the House of Representatives, one representative
even created a "Lettermanesque" top ten list for the V-chip:
[Flrom the home office of the Family Empowerment Coali-
tion, the top 10 unintended consequences of the . .. V-chip
mandate: No. 10, bureaucrats will be able to pick the show
your kids watch, but will not read them a bedtime story.
No. 9, rating tens of thousands of hours of shows each year
is fim, easy, and fat free, but it will not be cheap. No. 8,
the viewer is upset that V-chip is not as good as the origi-
nal show with that Ponch guy. No. 7, Oh, I am sorry, No. 7
has been blocked out by Government censors. No. 6, Angela
Lansbury now stars in "Jaywalking, She Wrote." No. 5, pro-
vides jobs for unemployed Federal bureaucrats. No.4, will
not work on that old out-of-date TV you bought last week.
No. 3, brings back all the intrusive Big Government atti-
tude that we all miss. No. 2, C-SPAN's annual NEA debate
blocked out for sexual content. And the No. 1 unintended
consequence of the . .. V-chip: blocks Regis, spares Kathie
Lee. 2
However, for nearly every claim against the V-chip there is a
more persuasive countervailing argument. Additionally, there
are persuasive justifications for the V-chip.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was passed by an over-
whelming majority of Congress. Although this may reflect sup-
port for other provisions in the act, it may also reflect a similar
sentiment of a survey which found that ninety percent of those
polled support the inclusion of V-chip technology in new televi-
230. President William J. Clinton, The President, Vice President, and Mrs. Gore
Discuss the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Demonstrate How the V-chip
Functions *8 (Feb. 9, 1996) (transcript available at 1996 WL S6227).
231. Tom Shales, Chip of Fools; Any Way you Program It, the V-Chip Is a Long
Stride Toward Censorship, WAS-L POST, Mar. 10, 1996, at G1 [hereinafter Chip of
Fools].
232. 141 CONG. REC. H8490-91 (1995) (statement of Rep. Hayworth from Arizona).
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sion sets.2" This sort of support is probably related to the
feeling that "violent and sexually explicit programming desensi-
tizes children and can influence their behavior and emotional
development."2" Recently, the "National Television Violence
Study," an analysis of programs on commercial broadcast, cable
and public television that was commissioned by the cable televi-
sion industry, found that violent programs are a potential
minefield, posing "substantial risks," which "include learning to
behave violently, becoming more desensitized to the harmful
consequences of violence, and becoming more fearful of being
attacked.""5 The study found that violence is found in forty-
four percent of network programs and eighty-five percent of
cable programs."'
Whereas television viewing was once a family activity where
parents regulated what their children watched, "changes in
society and technology have made it more difficult for parents
to monitor their children's exposure to television program-
ming.""' One of the main purposes of the V-chip is to "pro-
vide families [with] the ability to determine the kind of infor-
mation their children see and hear on television consistent with
their family's values."238 In a roundtable discussion with par-
ents and children hosted by the President, Vice-President and
First Lady, a child stated that he liked the "V-chip because it
doesn't automatically do anything, but... gives the parents
the power to control" what their children watch.239 However,
even President Clinton recognized that "parents now have to do
their end of the job and decide what they do or don't want
their young children to see .... The responsibility of parents to
do this is something they deserve, and something they plainly
233. 141 CONG. REC. E1436 (1995) (statement of Rep. Markey).
234. 141 CONG. REC. H8496 (1995) (statement of Rep. Waxman).
235. Bill Reed, Public TV Continues Tradition of Quality Programming and Public
Service, KAN. CITY STAR, Mar. 11, 1996, at B5.
236. Littlefield, supra note 228, at F7.
237. 141 CONG. REC. H8496 (1995) (statement of Rep. Waxman).
238. President William J. Clinton, The President and Vice President Deliver Re-
marks After Signing the Telecommunications Act of 1996 *29-30 (transcript available
at 1996 WL 73750) (Feb. 8, 1996).
239. Michael Eisenbrey, The President, Vice President and the First Lady Partici-
pate in a Roundtable Discussion on T.V. Violence *33 (transcript available at 1996
WL 90866) (Mar. 1, 1996).
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need."' In fact, President Clinton went so far as to say that
the V-chip "can become a powerful voice against teen violence,
teen pregnancy, and teen drug use.""4
Although there has been widespread support for the V-chip,
opponents have expressed concerns and concocted apocalyptic
visions of a V-chip using United States. In fact, Brandon
Tartikoff, NBC's former programming chief, said that "[ilt may
not be Hitler going into Poland, but it's still an invasion. Once
you open the door, you're inviting two things to happen: censor-
ship, and the government getting into a business it has no
business being in. Where is it going to end?" 2 Some even feel
that the V-chip
will not only fail to "clean up" TV, but will actually make
things worse. With a rating system and a V-chip in
place ... networks will no longer have to censor the con-
tent of shows. The [V-chip] could be a shield protecting pro-
grams that have far more explicit sex and violence than
anything on the air today.2"
However, such a prospect is unlikely as long as such material
would still be regulated by 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and limited to the
"safe harbor" period, or banned as obscene material.
One of the greatest concerns expressed by broadcasters is the
money factor. The money factor appears in two forms, loss of
advertising and cost of implementing. Ted Turner, among oth-
ers thought that the V-chip could cost broadcasters "quite a bit
of money" as advertisers would avoid some shows.' However,
others, such as NBC President Robert Wright and ABC's Presi-
dent Robert Inger, disagree by asserting that sponsors have
always screened shows and know the show's content before they
buy time.' An analyst for Merrill Lynch agreed with Wright
and Inger when he said that labeling programs would neither
change the way advertisers pursue their key viewer demograph-
240. Supra note 238.
241. Id. at *30.
242. Chip of Fools, supra note 231 at 65; Hontz et al., supra note 222, at 27.
243. Chip of Fools, supra note 231, at 65.
244. Cooperation, supra note 220.
245. Id.
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ics, nor the way shows deliver them.2" Additionally, the audi-
ence lost through the V-chip is precisely the segment of the
audience that programmers are not targeting when they include
sexual and violent scenes.247 One parent considered the V-chip
to be a voting mechanism, by which a lack of viewers will
cause advertisers to reduce advertisements during that pro-
gram, thereby prompting programmers to reconsider the content
of the program blocked by many households.2"
The argument that the cost of implementing the V-chip man-
date and rating system would be prohibitive is also suspect.
First, the V-chip has been projected to cost less than five dol-
lars under the Burton/Markey proposal.249 If a person can af-
ford to spend hundreds of dollars on a new television, their cost
analysis will not be affected by a five dollar increase from a
chip. The argument that a rating system would be expensive is
not so easily dismissed. Some claim that a massive bureaucracy
will be created to rate the massive number of hours of televi-
sion programming."' Although a massive undertaking at first,
the rating of new shows will not require quite as much man-
power in the future. Additionally, there is already a bureaucra-
cy in place to regulate television, the FCC. Regardless, someone
will be paid to rate programs.
Another argument proffered by V-chip opponents is that the
V-chip technology does not exist,"' and would take years to
have an effect.252 In response to the claim that the technology
does not exist, one needs only to look to our northern neighbor,
Canada. Canada has performed tests in the Toronto area in-
volving several television stations including a Fox station out of
Buffalo, New York.253 The tests have been spearheaded by
Canada's two largest cable operators without a governmental
246. Hontz et al., supra note 229, at 27.
247. H.R. REP. No. 204, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 225 (1995).
248. Supra note 239.
249. House Nears Passage of Telecom Bill, COMM. DAILY, Aug. 3, 1995, available in
WESTLAW, 1995 WL 9473429.
250. Chip of Fools, supra note 231, at G1.
251. 141 CONG. REC. S12209 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
252. 142 CONG. REC. S1631 (1996) (statement of Sen. Simon).
253. Joint TV-Program Ratings with U.S. Proposed by Canada, WALL ST. J., Oct.
17, 1995, at B4.
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mandate through V-chip legislation.' Most Canadians who
have participated in the test have endorsed the blocking de-
vice." Canada's system has more than twenty different ways
to block out objectionable programming." Because of the suc-
cess in Canada, the chairman of the Canadian Radio-Television
and Telecommunications Commission has threatened to
scramble American television signals coming into Canada un-
less they are encoded." '
Although the technology apparently exists, it is unclear how
long it will take for the technology to be in most American
living rooms. The problem is that the V-chip is only mandated
in new televisions. What will happen to those who do not buy
new televisions? Most likely, they will not have the ability to
block programs without having similar technology installed in
their present televisions. Another possibility is that there will
be other technologies available to block programs. Regardless,
the fact that it may take years for there to be a significant
percentage of televisions with the V-chip should not deter the
goal of providing parents with the ability to block programs.
Opponents have also questioned whether the programming of
the V-chip will even take place or be changed by technologically
adept children." "How will the device be made easy enough
for parents to use yet complicated enough to confound
teenagers' attempts to bypass it?"259 There is an obvious
trade-off working here. Where the programming of the V-chip is
made easier for the parents to use, it also becomes easier for
children to override. If the programming involves a difficult
procedure so that children cannot change it easily, parents may
254. Joanne Ingrassia, U.S. Stations Get in on Canadian V-chip Tests, ELECTRONIC
MEDIA, Feb. 26, 1996, at 41.
255. Id.
256. Joanne Ingrassia, Canada Eyes U.S. as it Tests V-chip., ELECTRONIC MEDIA,
Mar. 4, 1996, at 26.
257. Id.
258. V-Chip No Substitute for Judgment, STATE J.-REG., Mar. 3, 1996, at 52; Mike
Redmond, Mom's ?Wo' Out-V-Chips Technology, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 9, 1996, at
D1.
259. Steve Johnson, V-Chip Fueling Censorship Debate: The Government Could be
Buried up to Its Eyeballs in Controversy if it Insists on Creating a Ratings System to
Curb Violence and Sex on Television, CI. TRIB., Feb. 11, 1996, at 1 [hereinafter V-
Chip Fueling].
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not be able to program it themselves. There is also the question
as to whether parents will take the time to look at the ratings
and program the V-chip when they had failed in the past to
monitor their children's television viewing for lack of time or
presence.260 If so, parents may forego the trouble and the V-
chip would fail to meet its objective; "to give parents the tech-
nological capacity to be able to block their children from seeing
[certain programs] when they are not in the home or not in the
same room as their children."26 '
An ironic argument is that rating and blocking certain pro-
grams may result in an attraction to "the forbidden fruit." One
study indicates that the current "parental advisory" on televi-
sion programming actually can be an enticement to juvenile
boys.26' It has also been suggested that the R rating is a mag-
net for adolescents. 26' There is probably no solution to this
problem except for better parent-child relationships.
C. Possible Effects on the ACT Decisions
How does the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the V-chip
mandate fit in with the series of ACT cases? First, the Act has
supplied evidence and a record of the reasons why such a step
is needed, a hurdle that the FCC and Congress failed to over-
come until the ACT IIIR case. Second, unlike the ban on inde-
cent broadcasting, the blocking of television programs will not
require rating and implementation by the government. Instead,
the ban will require rating and implementation by private indi-
viduals, whether it be the parents who program the V-chip or
the independent committee that rates the programs. Because
industry has planned to establish the ratings and transmit
them, it is unlikely that the government will be involved, and
260. 142 CONG. REC. S1631-32 (1996) (statement of Sen. Simon) ( T]he homes that
most need to use the V-chip will not use it .... Too often, the children of parents
[in high-crime areas] are desperately trying to get by, and if watching more violence
keeps the children off the streets, it will strike many parents as a reasonable trade-
off.").
261. Markey Chip, supra note 214, at 12.
262. Id.
263. 142 CONG. REC. S1631 (1996) (statement of Sen. Simon).
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hence it will be difficult to claim that the government is re-
stricting or censoring speech.
However, both the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the
ACT cases concern overlapping groups of television program-
ming. Whereas the Telecommunications Act of 1996 deals with
all programming, the ACT cases deal with only a certain type
of broadcasting, that of indecent material. The V-chip may
successfully shift the burden of protecting children back to the
parents by giving them the ability to monitor what their chil-
dren watch even while not supervised. Nevertheless, the gov-
ernment may still assert its independent interest in the well-
being of children and continue to have indecent broadcasting
channeled into certain times. Although one might think that
the V-chip would render the channeling of indecent material to
certain hours unnecessary, this is not the case-at least for
now.
First, one must remember that the V-chip is only required for
new television sets. Therefore, there will be large numbers of
families without any protection except for the channeling of
indecent material to late night hours. Second, there will still be
the need to protect those children whose parents fail to pro-
gram the V-chip or who have bypassed the parents' program-
ming. Just because the V-chip will help protect children does
not mean that the governments independent interest in pro-
tecting children has been fulfilled. However, there will be a
question as to whether the ban is still the least restrictive
means of achieving the governments interest. Courts may not
find that there is a reasonable risk that large numbers of chil-
dren will be exposed to indecent material because of the use of
the V-chip.2 ' Therefore, broadcasters may once again chal-
lenge the FCC regulations channeling indecent material, while
not challenging the V-chip. However, such a challenge would
likely fail until the V-chip technology has significantly spread to
households throughout the nation. Should a challenge succeed,
the fears that the V-chip would make television programming
worse may come true." Additionally, Chief Judge Edwards'
264. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
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concerns in ACT III 66 and ACT IIIR' over possible differ-
ence in opinions between parents and the FCC over what is
indecent may extend to the rating system. Nor does the V-chip
remove his concern that the channeling of indecent material
may not correspond with parents' perceptions of indecent mate-
rial.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Government and FCC have a long standing precedent of
regulating broadcasting. From the inception of the Radio Act of
1927,21 indecent broadcasting has been regulated. The regula-
tion of broadcasting has experienced a number of stages. At
first, there was little enforcement of the ban on indecent broad-
casting, until an interview by Jerry Garcia was found to be
patently offensive. 269 The FCC formulated a generic definition
of indecency in Pacifica,7° which still stands today. After Pa-
cifica, the FCC, Congress and the courts began a series of re-
sponses, rules and decisions. The rules for broadcasting inde-
cent material changed from a midnight to 6:00 a.m. safe har-
bor, to a 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. ban, to a twenty-four hour
ban, to a combination of midnight to 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m.
to 6:00 a.m. safe harbors, and finally back to a 10:00 p.m. to
6:00 a.m. safe harbor. However, the 10:00 p.m. to 6 a.m. safe
harbor is not conclusive, for the ACT IIIR court found that a
midnight to 6 a.m. safe harbor could be constitutional,27' and
invited the FCC to promulgate rules for and create a record
supporting such a safe harbor.2
With the increased questioning of the assumptions on which
the ban is based and the prospect of V-chip being required, the
current status of the law is likely to change. D.C. Chief Circuit
Judge Edwards reflected this perspective in his concurring
266. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 180-98 and accompanying text.
268. 44 Stat. 1162, 47 U.S.C.A. § 81-83.
269. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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opinion in ACT II1P" and his dissenting opinion in ACT
IIIR. 4 In fact, if the assumptions are incorrect or the FCC's
interpretation of patently offensive does not coincide with pre-
vailing social norms, the law should change.
Until the V-chip is present in most televisions, it is unlikely
that the FCC will drop all regulation of indecent material. This
is because there seems to be an inherent distrust of parents'
ability to supervise their children, not to mention the
government's independent interest in the well-being of children.
The FCC may keep the safe harbor and ban for these reasons.
However, such regulation will become more difficult to justify
as the protection of children is provided through the V-chip. At
some point, the First Amendment rights of adults will exceed
these waning compelling interests and the ban will be abol-
ished. The same result could occur from the realization that
children are not actually harmed by indecent material. Howev-
er, nothing except for a change in the hours of the safe harbor,
to midnight to 6 a.m., will likely occur until the realization of
the V-chip.
Brett Ferenchak
273. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 180-98 and accompanying text.
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